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Abstract
In an age where information is plentiful and access to it is practically unlimited, the veracity of
information is frequently an afterthought. Previous research has demonstrated that individuals
may often be reluctant to alter their beliefs and attitudes even after false information is corrected.
This phenomenon is known as the continued-influence effect or the continued influence of
misinformation (CIM). Misinformation and “fake news” have grown more common, and their
effectiveness may be explained by CIM. Research also shows that schemas can have significant
effects on how information is processed, and preexisting beliefs, values and attitudes can affect
what information is readily absorbed, ignored, forgotten or invented. Individuals with more
extreme partisan schemas, particularly conservatives, may be more vulnerable to misinformation.
The current study was an examination of CIM in college students and the general population
who were exposed to fake news, corrections of fake news, or both. The hypotheses that attitudes
about initial misinformation and degree of belief change upon correction would vary by partisan
schema strength were partially supported.
Keywords: fake news, misinformation, schemas, political beliefs, continued influence of
misinformation

Elephants Never Forget: Partisan Schemas and the Continued Influence of Misinformation
People must process an overwhelming amount of information on a daily basis, and
verifying the credibility or relevance of information is often an afterthought. Mitchell et al.
(2018) found that only about a third of U.S. adults were able to correctly identify a set of news
headlines as facts or opinions, and were less accurate if the headlines were aligned with their
own political ideology; for many, judgments of the accuracy and truthfulness of news depended
on how much they agreed with it. Despite this, there is a growing awareness of the prevalence of
misinformation, more commonly known as “fake news.”
Approximately half of Americans currently consider misinformation a “very big
problem” today, and 68% agree that it has eroded trust in the U.S. political system (Mitchell et
al., 2019). For example, in a 2020 survey, most Americans (71%) reported that they were
familiar with a conspiracy theory that claims that the COVID-19 pandemic was planned or
intentional (Mitchell et al., 2020). However, partisanship was predictive of whether or not an
individual actually believed in the COVID-19 conspiracy theory: 34% of Republicans stated that
the theory was “probably or definitely” true compared to only 18% of Democrats, and this
occurred despite little difference in how likely both groups were to be familiar with the claim.
Republicans (63%) were also more likely than Democrats (18%) to say that the pandemic has
been exaggerated (Mitchell et al., 2020). In another study, Americans reported that they still
believe in a conspiracy theory stating that former U.S. president Barack Obama was born outside
the U.S., and those beliefs also fell along partisan lines: 38% of self-described “very strong”
Republicans believed the conspiracy theory compared to only 11% of “very strong” Democrats
(Jardina & Traugott, 2019). Regardless of efforts to debunk and correct it, misinformation (such
as conspiracy theories) has been shown to influence beliefs and reasoning, and research suggests

that prior experience and knowledge, or schemas, may play a role in the effectiveness of both the
initial misinformation and the corrections.
The perseverance of false beliefs as a result of fake news demonstrates a phenomenon
known as the continued-influence effect, or the continued influence of misinformation (CIM),
which describes how the reconstructive processes of memory can decrease the likelihood that
beliefs will be updated after correction or retraction of the original misinformation (Anderson et
al., 1980; H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994; McFarland et al., 2007; Ross et al., 1975). Perception
and memory are generally understood to be constructions, not copies, of experiences. Research
suggests these constructions are influenced by situational and dispositional factors that impact
both the ability to process information (e.g. capacity limits) and the motivation to do so (e.g.
interest or involvement). As a result, human memory is rife with errors of various consequence,
colored by assumptions and inferences, mingled with traces of the original events or details
(Roediger & DeSoto, 2015). Bartlett (1932) argued that perceiving, comprehending and
remembering are a function of an individual’s schemas for understanding of the world. Schemas
include stereotypes, and those related to strong political and social beliefs have been shown to
exert considerable influence over processing of misinformation (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985;
Bronstein et al., 2019; Greenstein & Franklin, 2020; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Walter et al., 2020).
Therefore, in a polarized political environment awash with misinformation, schematic processing
may directly impact the perceiver’s ability to determine the veracity of information and
subsequent correction, particularly for individuals with extreme partisan schemas.
Schemas
Schemas are generally considered functional, adaptive and efficient (Bargh, 1982); they
are representations of past experience that become theories about reality and new experiences

(Bartlett, 1932; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). As organizations of preexisting knowledge and
memories, schemas include concrete matters (e.g. places, objects, people) and the abstract (e.g.
beliefs, relationships, attitudes) (Baldwin, 1992; Brewer & Nakamura, 1984; Brewer & Treyens,
1981; Judd & Kulik, 1980). A schema helps to reduce cognitive load by fitting new information
into existing concepts rather than having to start from scratch to understand new things, such as
how to navigate a social situation or the purpose of a novel object. For example, if one were
dressing for work, the jeans and motorcycle jacket would be ignored; attention would be directed
toward the schema-appropriate selection of collared shirts. Similarly, a new pair of jeans would
not be mistaken as office appropriate, and with little complex thought a rental car can be driven
the familiar route to the office. Schemas work quite well for routine tasks and everyday
information processing, and they allow perceivers to preserve precious cognitive resources for
more complex problems. Therefore, information that is schema-consistent would generally be
easier to process than information that is schema-inconsistent. Given that most of our
information processing is fairly trivial, schematic thinking tends to be the rule rather than the
exception (see Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and the costs are quite modest in comparison to the
energy-saving benefits. In essence, a schema is both a framework for organizing existing
information one already has and for how to interpret new information. As Bartlett himself put it,
“The influence of 'schemata' is influence by the past” and he argued that memory is not divorced
from context (1932).
A long history of research suggests that preexisting beliefs, attitudes and values in the
form of schemas influence the likelihood of scrutinizing incoming information, which is
selectively encoded and organized according to thematic structures. This is often referred to as
the consistency bias; attitude-relevant information is more easily processed and recalled, new

information and experiences tend to be assimilated into existing schemas, and conflicting,
ambiguous or confusing information is later remembered as having been more in line with the
individual’s preexisting schema (Bergman & Roediger, 1999; Gawronski, 2012). Judd and Kulik
(1980) asked participants to rate how much they agreed or disagreed with varying statements
about contentious social issues (e.g. capital punishment, women’s rights, and majority rule in
South Africa), to rate how pro/anti each statement was for the social issue, and they were asked
to recall the statements the next day. Participants responded more quickly, and recalled
statements more accurately, when they had previously agreed/disagreed more strongly;
statements that participants responded to more moderately were more difficult to remember later.
The authors argued that attitudes, as social schemas, drive expectations about the type of
information that is likely to be encountered and that, particularly for bipolar issues, people expect
to encounter very agreeable or quite disagreeable information, which facilitates the encoding and
retention of information that is either highly schema-consistent or highly contradictory. In
another example, study participants in a graduate student’s office recalled the presence of objects
consistent with existing schemas for a university office (e.g. books) even if those objects were
not present (Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Information that is inconsistent with an individual’s
existing schemas is more likely to be forgotten or ignored, while information that is consistent is
recalled with relative ease and becomes salient in decision-making (Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985;
Tuckey & Brewer, 2003). Schemas are vital in what individuals pay attention to, how the
information is processed, what is ultimately learned, and the constructive nature of recall. Of
particular interest for the current study is how schemas likely contribute to the processing and
retention of misinformation after correction.

Schema Theory and the Continued Influence of Misinformation
The continued influence of misinformation (CIM) tends to be explained as an artifact of
the way memory and memory organization (schemas) are broadly understood to work.
Information in the form of an “engram,” or memory trace, is processed and encoded into
semantic long-term memory, where it is stored for later inclusion in a reconstructive process
(Baddeley, 1966; Bartlett, 1932; Dudai, 2004; Goldstein, 2014; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009).
Details may be recalled correctly but misattributed to another familiar or commonly referenced
source, or schema-related knowledge may be used to fill knowledge gaps, resulting in flawed but
stable memories rich with plausible elements that contribute to the recaller’s confidence (Kleider
et al., 2008). In a similar way, corrections and new learning become associated and intertwined
with the initial misinformation. Misinformation is not simply unlearned or removed from
memory; it continues to contribute and interfere in a variety of ways (Ayers & Reder, 1998).
Alternatively, corrections of previous information may become an addendum that “tags” the
initial misinformation with a negation, which may be lost over time or overlooked under stress or
time constraints (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1998).
Factors related to the information itself also appear to influence CIM. For example, much
past research suggests that misinformation that is causal (i.e. explains events, such as “the
building caught on fire because of improperly stored gasoline”) results in greater CIM, and that
effective corrections must be both plausible and causal in nature (H. M. Johnson & Seifert, 1994;
Rapp & Kendeou, 2007; Schul & Mazursky, 1990; Seifert, 2002). In other words, corrective
messages should have as much explanatory power as the misinformation in order to be effective.
Ecker et al. (2011) applied varying strengths of encoding for misinformation and then tested the
effectiveness of retractions; both strong and weak memory encoding resulted in CIM. While a

strong retraction reduced memory strength for misinformation, no amount of retraction
eliminated CIM completely. The results supported previous findings that even weakly encoded
misinformation was resistant to retraction (Schul & Mazursky, 1990).
Evidence suggests that schema-consistent information is perceived and recalled easily
and quickly, a process referred to as fluency, which likely contributes to CIM. As experience or
information becomes routine, it becomes schematic. Thus, information that has been encountered
frequently becomes schematic and is more likely to be considered factual or accurate later, even
if the individual was made aware that it was false (Pennycook et al., 2018). In one study of this
“illusory truth effect,” DiFonzo et al. (2016) found that repetitive exposure to rumors impacted
the validity judgements of the rumors. Processing fluency, or the relative ease with which
participants could process statements due to familiarity, mediated the validity judgements,
suggesting that familiarity played a role in susceptibility to rumor acceptance. Pennycook et al.
(2018) found that even relatively implausible headlines from (actual) fake news articles shared
online were judged as more accurate after only a single previous exposure (although extremely
implausible statements such as “Smoking cigarettes is good for your lungs” were unconvincing).
The familiarity effect occurred despite warnings that the headline was disputed or contested by
fact-checkers. The authors suggest that such disclaimers are likely ineffective weapons against
misinformation because relatively little exposure to plausible statements is necessary to increase
perceived accuracy of information. Fazio et al. (2015) also found that prior knowledge was not
particularly effective at preventing illusory truth effects, which demonstrated a “knowledge
neglect” in favor of processing fluency. In short, many factors influence memory encoding,
recall and ultimately CIM, particularly prior experience and familiarity, suggesting that schemas
may be a significant factor in misinformation and correction.

Personal Schemas and Misinformation
Schemas and their components may be particularly influential in the memory for, and
resilience to, misinformation, under conditions that reduce the likelihood of analytical thinking.
In one study, Pennycook and Rand (2019), found that those with higher scores on the Cognitive
Reflection Test, a measure of likelihood to engage in analytical thinking, were better able to
discern fake news and real news, even if the headlines did not match the participants’ own
political ideology. Those with lower scores were less likely to pick the false or true headlines
apart. Other studies found similar effects (De keersmaecker & Roets, 2017; Zhu et al., 2010). In
one study of misinformation during political campaigns, Murphy et al. (2019) demonstrated that
false memories relevant to issue-based voting could be experimentally manipulated, particularly
among those who scored lower in analytical thinking. The study used either real or fake news
about scandals on either side of Ireland’s abortion referendum campaign, and asked participants
if they remembered the events. Those in favor of the referendum to repeal an abortion ban were
more likely to “remember” a fake news scandal for the opposing campaign; those opposed to the
repeal were more likely to recall a fabricated scandal for those in favor. The effect was stronger
for participants who scored low on a measure of cognitive ability.
The tendency to favor schematic processing over analytical thinking has also been linked
to individual difference variables such as fear of negative evaluation, harm avoidance, and
cooperativeness, characteristics that Zhu et al. (2010) found were predictive of a vulnerability to
misinformation. Bronstein et al. (2019) found that traits such as dogmatism, delusionality, and
religious fundamentalism were positively related to belief in fake (but not true) news, and the
authors noted that the traits also shared a common link with reduced propensity for analytic
thinking. Individual differences in sociopolitical views have been connected to schema-based

processing. A long history of research suggests that value-relevant attitudes, especially political
or social ones, are among the strongest (Johnson & Eagly, 1989), and strongly held and valueladen attitudes serve to maximize processing of information that matches attitudes and to
exaggerate the dissimilarity of information that is in contrast, as in schemas (Sherif & Hovland,
1961). Schemas impact how a person responds to information, and partisan schemas representing
strong political and social beliefs may be particularly salient in processing information relevant
to these schemas, often the subject of both real and fake news.
The Influence of Partisan Schemas
Schemas encompass an individual’s worldview, including their political and social
beliefs, values and attitudes, and political bias has been linked to differences in information
processing (Dodd et al., 2012, 2016; Jost et al., 2003). Research suggests that partisan political
attitudes are among the strongest of convictions and they predict intolerance of opposing beliefs
(van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2017). In addition, those with stronger partisan schemas more readily
learn and accept information that supports those beliefs, and are more likely to ignore corrections
that contradict their political views; partisanship affects both learning and memory (Johnson &
Eagly, 1989; Khanna & Sood, 2018; Taber & Lodge, 2006). For example, in three studies,
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) found that the effect of corrections was conditional on the strength of
preexisting attitudes; corrective information was most successful when it aligned with strongly
held partisan beliefs, and was the least successful when the correction was counter-attitudinal.
These effects were particularly robust among U.S. conservatives. Researchers have offered
several explanations for such partisan differences in information processing. Some have found a
connection between conservative schemas and disinterest in novel stimuli (Carraro et al., 2011;
Dodd et al., 2012; Shook & Fazio, 2009), low tolerance for uncertainty, and a high need for

closure (Jost et al., 2003). In short, many of the traits associated with misinformation
vulnerability (e.g. dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, etc.; Bronstein et al., 2019) may be
more common to those with strong conservative political bias (Jost et al., 2003).
Axt et al. (2020) found that simply calling information “fake news” often appeals to
conservative political schemas. The researchers conducted several experiments in order to better
understand what draws people to make fake news attributions. Participants read about errors
made in reporting the news that either matched their political beliefs or were schemainconsistent, and then indicated how much they believed the error was due to intentional
deception or incompetence. Results suggested that the fake news label appealed to the
conservative participants; it satisfied a need for structure and certainty, and a tendency to
attribute mistakes in the news to a more purposeful reason (i.e. intentional deception) rather than
simple errors in reporting. In other words, it may be easier to imagine news organizations
conspiring to release fake news for malicious ends that are predictable and concrete, rather than
complex reasons that are difficult to pin down or solve. Both increased tendency to make fake
news attributions, and vulnerability to fake news itself, are related to partisanship.
Because schemas exert influence over what individuals learn and remember, those with
strong schemas likely seek out and more readily learn information (e.g. real or fake news) that is
consistent with their schemas, while ignoring or rejecting information that is not. Due to the
strength of political beliefs and associated values, misinformation that appeals to preexisting
schemas about the nature of political figures may be particularly effective on strong partisan
schemas. In particular, CIM may have a more powerful effect on those with strong conservative
schemas who are motivated to manage the threats of uncertainty and complexity (Jost et al.,
2003).

Current Studies
The above literature review suggests that message content and delivery, as well as
individual differences in the form of political beliefs and schemas, may make people
differentially vulnerable to misinformation by promoting the use of mental shortcuts, decrease
the likelihood of analytical thinking, impair memory, and thus increase CIM, particularly for
conservative political schemas. The current studies were designed to respond to calls for further
research on the relationship between CIM and preexisting attitudes and beliefs (Ecker et al.,
2014), particularly in relationship to political orientation (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Our
hypotheses were that participants who identified as strongly partisan would 1) be less critical of
misinformation that was schema-consistent, 2) be less resistant to a correction that was schemaconsistent, 3) be more critical of misinformation that was schema-inconsistent, and 4) be more
resistant to a correction that was schema-inconsistent. The effects were expected to be stronger
among conservatives.
Study 1
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from the Bridgewater State University SONA subject pool,
which is comprised primarily of students enrolled in the Introduction to Psychology course in
order to earn course credit. There were 287 participants (94 males, 181 females, and 12 who
indicated other or did not specify; Mage = 18.62). In terms of ethnicity, participants primarily
identified as Caucasian/White (72.8%), followed by African American/Black (10.5%),
Latino/Hispanic (7%), Asian/Pacific Islander (1.4%), and other (3.8%), and some did not

respond (4.5%). There were 103 participants that identified as Democrat, 42 that identified as
Republican, and 110 that identified with no party.
Measures
The dependent variable, the continued influence of misinformation, was measured by the
Likert scale ratings of the target on 15 different attributes (e.g. “intelligent,” “responsible;” see
Appendix A). Participants also responded to several attitude measures. The variable of particular
interest was political orientation. We included a single item that asked which political party the
participant identified with (Republican, Democrat, or no party) and one question that asked
participants to rate their self-identified political leaning on a 0-7 scale from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative. We also included the Political Belief Scale (PBS; Webber et al., 2018),
which was designed to study extremist beliefs. Participants rated their agreement with a series of
statements that represent liberal, moderate, and conservative policies and values (liberal α = .77;
moderate α = .66; conservative α = .83, as reported by Webber et al., 2018a). Participants also
completed the Social-Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto et al., 2011), which is designed to
capture beliefs in societal group hierarchies and generalized prejudice (α = 83, as reported by
Pratto et al., 1994). Scale reliability results for all studies are reported in Table 1.
Procedure
The project was IRB approved and data collection was completed during the Fall of
2019. Participants entered the lab and were instructed to sit at a computer with a packet and
pencil in front of them, and after signing the informed consent document, they could begin
completing the packet. At certain points in the packet, they were prompted to advance a
slideshow on the computer in front of them. The slide directed the participant to click on links to
actual websites which varied based on condition. This way, the articles appeared in a realistic

manner, and the effect of misinformation and efficacy of corrective news reports increased the
external validity of the study.
The fake news article was hosted on a “satire” news website called Taters Gonna Tate
(www.tatersgonnatate.com, now defunct; article archived at http://archive.is/W5iHx), and
claimed that Democrat House Representative Rashida Tlaib committed election fraud and was
under investigation. While the article makes this claim repeatedly, it also contradicts itself
several times, and the article is posted under the category of “Satire and/or Conservative Fan
Fiction,” making it possible for an astute reader to determine that the article is misinformation
and the source is unreliable. The correction article was posted on the reputable fact-checking
website Snopes (https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/rashida-tlaib-investigation/). The Snopes
article explicitly corrected the exact article posted to Taters Gonna Tate, accurately reporting that
the original story was a “complete fabrication,” on a network of websites “infamous for
generating politically inflammatory misinformation under the guise of proffering ‘satire,’” and
suggesting that some misinformation is originally distributed in this manner (Mikkelson, 2019).
The study was originally designed with six conditions total (3x2). In C1, participants read
the fake news article online with negative misinformation about the politician (Rashida Tlaib),
and the correction. Participants completed the individual differences scales between reading the
fake news article and the correction. In C2, participants read the correction only. In C3,
participants read the fake news article only. Participants completed all parts of the packet and
were debriefed and dismissed. The corresponding experimental conditions in which the target
was a Republican politician (C4, C5 and C6) were unable to be completed due to the COVID-19
pandemic.

Results
A mean target rating was calculated by aggregating the 15 attributes. There were no
significant differences between the ratings of the target of fake news in C1 (M = 2.59) and C3 (M
= 2.44) (p = .27). Additionally, participant ratings of the target of the correction article in C1 (M
= 3.19) and C2 (M = 3.33) were not significantly different (p = .35).
To test the hypotheses regarding CIM, the C1 pre-correction ratings were subtracted from
the post-correction ratings to create a measure of rating change. For those who identified as
Democrat, Mchange = 0.84; for those who identified as Republican, Mchange = -0.01; and for those
who identified with no party, Mchange = 0.63. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant
differences between the means for Republicans and Democrats (p = .03), Republicans and no
party (p = .03), but not between Democrats and no party (F(2,63) = 4.16, p = .37). Republican
participants updated their beliefs significantly less than Democrats and no party participants.
Conservative leaning (on the single-item Likert scale) predicted more critical evaluations
of the target overall: fake news r(136) = -.17, p = .05; correction r(124) = -.42, p < .01. However,
the correlation between self-identified political leaning and rating change did not quite reach
significance, r(64) = -.22, p = .08. Table 2 shows the results of correlations between scores on
the PBS, Social Dominance Orientation, and evaluations pre-correction, post-correction, and
rating change. Agreement with liberal statements on the PBS was significantly positively
correlated with evaluation of target before and after correction, but not with rating change.
Conservatism scores from the PBS were significantly negatively correlated with evaluation of
target after correction, but not with rating change. Moderate scores from the PBS were
significantly positively correlated with evaluation of target after correction and with rating
change (see Table 2), but had low reliability (see Table 1).

Discussion
The difference in the rating change between participants who identified as Republican
versus those that identified as Democrat or with no political party supported the hypothesis that
strong partisan schemas may influence CIM. Politically right-leaning participants updated their
beliefs about the Democrat target much less than politically left-leaning or neutral participants,
as expected.
The correlations indicated that participants’ pre-existing left or right-leaning political
beliefs were more strongly related to overall evaluations of the target than to rating change.
While moderate political beliefs were positively correlated with rating change, it is difficult to
interpret directionality. It may be that those high in moderate political beliefs updated their
beliefs to a greater degree, or that those low in moderate political beliefs updated their beliefs to
a lesser degree, or both.
Limitations
Overall, there was less evidence of CIM than in previous research; participants tended to
update their beliefs upon correction. This may be due to the relatively short duration between
receiving the misinformation and the correction, or because there was not significant power;
there were relatively few participants in C1 who identified with the Republican party or
otherwise expressed conservative leanings. Moderate scores on the PBS were relatively low in
reliability and were excluded from further analysis in Study 2 and Study 3.
A Republican target news article and associated survey was planned to be completed in
the Spring of 2020, however, the COVID-19 outbreak disrupted data collection after fewer than
50 students participated. Instead, a follow-up study was conducted to repeat the experiment with
all conditions present in a fully online format. This was to ensure that slight differences in

methods, or political beliefs shifting due to the pandemic itself, were not significant factors in
any resulting differences.
Additionally, Study 1 used actual fake news articles and corrections posted online to real
websites. However, finding equivalent fake news articles and corrections across all target
conditions was determined to be prohibitively difficult. Instead, Study 2 used a template derived
from an actual news article, and an original correction template designed by the researchers. This
allowed for greater internal validity across conditions by ensuring that the article was very
similar, aside from changing names and affiliations as appropriate.
Study 2
Method
Participants
Participants were once more recruited from the Bridgewater State University SONA
subject pool, which is comprised primarily of students enrolled in the Introduction to Psychology
course. They volunteered in order to earn course credit. There were 297 participants total
comprised of 76 males, 218 females, and 3 who specified non-binary or bigender (Mage = 19.54).
In terms of ethnicity, participants could select more than one category, and the most frequently
chosen category was Caucasian/White (75.8%), followed by African American/Black (12.8%),
Latino/Hispanic (7.1%), Asian/Pacific Islander (3.4%), Native American/American Indian
(1.7%), and other/non-specified (4.4%), and some chose not respond (1.3%). There were 165
participants that identified as Democrat, 35 that identified as Republican, and 97 that identified
as no party.

Measures
The dependent variable was similar to Study 1, with a slight change to more closely align
statements with Stereotype Content Model (SCM) dimensions of competence and warmth: we
removed an item that asked how “favorable” the article target is because nothing similar is
included in the SCM scale (see Appendix A). The Stereotype Content Model (Fiske et al., 2002)
has been used to describe racial and ethnic stereotypes along dimensions of competence and
warmth (competence α = .94; warmth α = .90 as reported by Fiske et al., 2002). Study 2 also
included the Intellectual Humility Scale (IH; Alfano et al., 2018), which has four subscales
supported by five confirmatory factor analyses and validity studies (convergent and divergent
with self-reported and informant personality and behavior) in two languages (Alfano et al.,
2017). Previous research found that intellectual humility is related to tolerance of opposing
views, despite the strength of an individual’s own partisan bias (Porter & Schumann, 2018), and
we sought to explore how this might be related to CIM. Scale reliability results for all studies are
reported in Table 1.
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete a survey hosted on Qualtrics and distributed online
via SONA, and were allowed to complete the survey at a time of their choosing. They were
randomly assigned to one of six possible conditions: Democrat fake news and correction (C1),
Republican fake news and correction (C2), neutral fake news and correction (C3), Democrat
correction only (C4), Republican correction only (C5) or neutral correction only (C6). The fake
news articles were fabrications designed by the researchers for the study. The material was based
on a United States Department of Justice website article about a bookkeeper charged with
embezzlement from their company (see: https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/philadelphia-

bookkeeper-convicted-embezzling-almost-16-million-former-employer). All names and
references to the company in the article were changed to refer to either Democrat House Rep.
Adam Schiff (C1/C4), Republican House Rep. Jim Jordan (C2/C5), or Starbucks CEO Kevin
Johnson (C3/C6), and appropriate organizations for each figure (see Appendix B). Schiff and
Jordan were selected as they were in equivalent positions within politics and somewhat known
outside of their respective states; Johnson was selected as the neutral target due to his association
with a familiar company, and neither he nor Starbucks have well-known or clear political
affiliations. Participants were told that the article had appeared on social media recently and was
shared from worldnewsdailyreport.com, a website which describes itself as “satire” and its
articles are routinely posted online as fake news. The corrections were framed as also having
been shared on social media, but from www.snopes.com, and were an explicit correction of the
fake news article. The corrections detailed the origin of the fake article and stated that no part of
it was true, and that the website it came from is known for other fake news articles (see
Appendix C). As in the previous study, between viewing the fake news and correction, or before
viewing the correction, participants completed scales including the PBS, the Social Dominance
Orientation Scale, and the Intellectual Humility scale. Afterwards, participants received credit for
completing the study and were dismissed.
Results
Warmth and competence ratings were calculated for each target. A multivariate analysis
of variance of final target ratings indicated there were no main effects for target or participant
political party, condition, and no significant interactions. Regardless of participant or target
political party, evaluations of the target after correction were close to, but not significantly
different from, those who only saw the correction article. To test the hypotheses about CIM, the

pre-correction ratings were subtracted from the post-correction ratings to measure rating change
in warmth and competence. Figure 1 shows pre and post ratings by participants who identified as
Democrats, Figure 2 shows ratings by Republicans, and Figure 3 shows ratings by participants
who endorsed no party. In these figures, Republicans appeared to update their competence and
warmth ratings for Democrat targets the least. However, analysis of variance by target political
party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) and participant political party did not reveal statistically
significant main effects or interactions. Participant political party (Democrat, Republican or
neutral) and target political party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) did not significantly
influence change in warmth and competence ratings (all p > .05). Low power likely impacted the
ability to find significant differences between groups. Because there were so few Republican
respondents, several experimental groups had fewer than 10 participants.
Correlational results suggested partial support for hypotheses 1 and 3 about partisan
schemas and target evaluation overall. Social dominance orientation was significantly negatively
correlated with final evaluations of competence (r(294) = -.15, p = .01) and warmth (r(294) = .12, p = .04), while the open-mindedness (r(294) = .16, p = .01) and engagement (r(294) = .12, p
= .04) from intellectual humility predicted more positive final competence evaluations.
Correlational results also suggested support for the hypotheses 2 and 4 regarding CIM and
partisan beliefs. Agreement with conservative statements on the PBS was significantly
negatively correlated with competence rating change (r(172) = -.20, p < .01) and warmth rating
change (r(172) = -.24, p < .01) across all targets. Rating change was also negatively correlated
with social dominance orientation (r(172) = -.26, p < .01 for competence, and r(172) = -.25, p <
.01 for change in warmth ratings). There were also significant correlations between total
Intellectual Humility scale scores and both competence rating change (r(172) = .17, p = .03) and

warmth rating change (r(172) = .16, p = .04). Individual Intellectual Humility subscales were
correlated with rating change depending on the target’s political affiliation (see Table 3 for more
detailed results).
Discussion
ANOVA results failed to support the hypothesis that participants would update their
beliefs differentially based on their own partisan schemas and the political affiliation of the target
about which they received misinformation and correction, likely because of low power. Trends
indicated that Democrats, Republicans and no party participants may update their beliefs upon
correction to varying degrees based on the target’s political affiliation. Democrats tended to
update for Democrat or neutral targets, and Republicans seemed to update less overall. Figure 2
shows what appears to be a clear difference by participants who identified as Republican in how
they update their competence and warmth ratings upon correction of fake news. Indeed, they
indicated a similar level of warmth but much higher competence for the Republican target before
the correction than for the Democrat target after correction. Republican participants also updated
their ratings the most for a Republican target. While separating by target did not reveal
statistically significant differences, the trends indicated that further research is warranted;
partisan schemas may have affected how participants responded to targets from different parties.
Correlational analyses indicated that final evaluations of targets’ competence and warmth
were associated with SDO, lending partial support for hypotheses 1 and 3. IH subscales for openmindedness and engagement were associated with evaluations of target competence. Intellectual
humility has been linked to tolerance of opposing views and political views in particular, which
may impact CIM. Porter and Schumann (2018) found that despite holding political beliefs of
similar strength, those higher in intellectual humility were still more tolerant of opposing

political views than those lower in intellectual humility. Therefore, we suggest that those with
greater intellectual humility may be more likely to update their beliefs upon correction as well.
However, the correlations were fairly weak despite statistical significance. The correlation
results indicated stronger support for hypotheses 2 and 4 regarding CIM: there were significant
negative correlations between PBS conservatism scores and rating change for competence and
warmth. In other words, the more conservative a participant was, the less they changed their
ratings of targets on correction. The effect of conservative schemas appeared to be stronger for
Democrat and neutral targets. Rating change was also negatively correlated with SDO, indicating
that extreme partisan beliefs about social hierarchies may affect CIM as well. With regard to
intellectual humility, it was the Republican and neutral targets who benefitted most. Higher
intellectual humility predicted somewhat more change for those targets, and intellectual humility
may be related to how likely one is to update their beliefs upon correction. While we reported
these results, we consider them to be exploratory in nature and not directly related to our
hypotheses.
Liberal views and intellectual humility were linked to a tendency to update beliefs upon
correction. The results also suggested that the degree to which individuals updated their beliefs
upon correction varied by target political party. Partisan schemas, particularly conservative ones,
seemed to impact the effectiveness of correction after exposure to fake news.
Limitations
Some trends could not be interpreted because of low power; there were few participants
who identified as Republican or neutral overall, which rendered very small sample sizes in some
conditions. The lack of Republican participants was an issue we sought to correct with Study 3
by using a different recruitment strategy.

Study 3
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from Prolific, an online subject pool. Recruitment criteria
were limited to only requiring U.S. nationality. Unlike the previous studies, participants of all
age groups and backgrounds were recruited. There were 223 participants total comprised of 93
males, 111 females, 7 who specified non-binary or bigender, and 1 who preferred not to answer
(Mage = 31.07). In terms of ethnicity, participants could select more than one category, and the
most frequently chosen category was Caucasian/White (66%) followed by Asian/Pacific Islander
(15.6%), African American/Black (10.8%), Latino/Hispanic (9.0%), Native American/American
Indian (1.9%), and other/non-specified (1.4%), and some chose not to respond (0.9%). There
were 130 participants that identified as Democrat, 27 that identified as Republican, and 55 that
identified as no party.
Measures
The same fake news articles were used. Variables were manipulated and measured in the
same manner as Study 2. Scale reliability results for all studies are reported in Table 1.
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete a survey identical to Study 2, using the same fake
news articles and corrections from Study 2 (any alterations were made to conform with Prolific
standards). Afterwards, participants were thanked, received acknowledgement and compensation
for completing the study ($1.98) and were dismissed.

Results
Warmth and competence ratings were calculated for each target; means are reported in
Table 4 for clarity. A multivariate analysis of variance of final target ratings indicated there were
no main effects for condition or participant political party, or their interaction. However, there
was a significant main effect for target political party (F(4, 364) = 4.35, p < .01). The univariate
test indicated that the effect for target was driven by higher mean ratings for the Democrat (0.40)
and Neutral (0.57) targets’ competence in comparison with the Republican (-0.17), F(2, 184) =
6.39, p < .01. Warmth ratings did not differ (MDem = -.11, MNeutral = -.09 and MRepub -.33; F(2,
184) = .99, p = .37). There was also a significant interaction between target and participant
political party (F(8, 364) = 2.17, p = .03). Republican participants rated the Republican target
significantly higher in competence (M = 0.46) than either Democrats (M = -0.41) or no party (M
= -0.20). Competence ratings for the other targets did not differ. Republican participants also
rated the Republican target significantly higher in warmth (M = 0.33) than either Democrats (M
= -0.83) or those affiliated with neither party (M = -0.59). Warmth ratings for the other targets
did not differ.
Figure 4 shows pre and post ratings by participants who identified as Democrats, Figure 5
shows ratings by Republicans, and Figure 6 shows ratings by participants who endorsed no party.
Figure 7 shows mean ratings of targets post correction by participant political party and target
political party.
As in Study 2, the pre-correction ratings were subtracted from the post-correction ratings
to measure rating change in warmth and competence. Analysis of variance by target political
party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) and participant political party did not reveal significant
main effects or interactions. Participant political party (Democrat, Republican or neutral) and

target affiliation (Democrat, Republican or neutral) did not significantly influence change in
warmth and competence ratings (all p > .05). While Figure 5 suggests that Republican
participants failed to update their competence and warmth ratings for Democrats, we cannot
conclude that there was an effect. As in Study 2, low power likely impacted the ability to find
significant differences between groups. Because there were so few Republican respondents,
several experimental groups had fewer than 10 participants.
Correlational analysis indicated differences by target political party. When the target was
a Democrat, there was a negative correlation between PBS conservatism and competence rating
(r(65) = -.24, p = .048), and a positive correlation between PBS liberalism and warmth rating
(r(65) = .30, p = .013). There was also a negative correlation between SDO and competence
rating for the Democrat target (r(65) = -.27, p = .029). For a Republican target, PBS
conservatism was positively correlated with both competence rating (r(63) = .36, p = .003) and
warmth rating (r(63) = .33, p = .007). Additionally, there were positive correlations between selfidentified political leaning and competence rating (r(63) = .44, p < .000) and warmth rating
(r(63) = .32, p = .009). For the neutral target, there was only a positive correlation between selfidentified political leaning and warmth rating (r(68) = .24, p = .043). Intellectual Humility
subscales were differentially correlated with rating change depending on the target’s political
affiliation as well (see Table 5 for more detailed results).
Discussion
Results partially supported hypotheses 1 and 3. Participants rated targets differently on
competence based on the target’s political affiliation, and this effect was driven mainly by much
lower ratings for the Republican target when compared to Democrat and neutral targets. This
was unsurprising as there were many more Democrat or no party participants than Republican.

Indeed, Republican participants rated the Republican target much higher on competence and
warmth, but rated Democrat and neutral targets similarly low on both.
As depicted in Figure 7, Democrat and no party participants rated targets similarly, while
Republican ratings for the Republican target were significantly different. Similar to Study 2,
Republican participants did appear to update their beliefs less than Democrat or no party (see
Figures 4, 5 and 6), but the results were not statistically significant, thus hypotheses 2 and 4 were
not fully supported, but the non-significant pattern from Study 2 was replicated.
Correlations between PBS scores and competence and warmth varied considerably by
target political party and provided some support for all hypotheses. When the target was a
liberal, attitudes predicted more positive final evaluations of warmth, while conservative
attitudes were linked to negative final evaluations of the target’s competence. When the target
was a Republican, liberalism did not predict final scores for competence or warmth, however,
conservatism predicted more positive final ratings on both dimensions. Correlations between the
Intellectual Humility Scale and target ratings of competence and warmth were also differentially
significant based on the target’s political party. Several subscales were significantly associated
with competence for a Democrat target, but other subscales were significantly associated with
warmth for a Republican target. While Intellectual Humility Scale results were exploratory in
nature not directly related to a hypothesis, they may be an interesting direction for future
research.
Limitations
As in Study 1 and Study 2, there were few participants who expressed conservative
beliefs or identified with the Republican party, resulting in low power. While we hoped to recruit
more Republican participants by using a public recruitment platform, the sample was not

sufficiently politically diverse, and we were unable to recruit enough participants overall due to
cost. Follow-up research will focus on greater numbers of participants for each condition, or
change recruitment strategies to target specific political groups.
General Discussion
Overall, participants did update their beliefs. The magnitude varied by participant and
target political party and mean target ratings were often vastly different, particularly between
Democrat and Republican participants, although low power limits the interpretation of the
patterns. Results suggested that Republican participants updated their ratings the least for targets
that were Democrat or neutral. In Study 1, Republicans were particularly critical and updated
their beliefs less when the target was a Democrat, however, data collection was interrupted
before comparison conditions with Republican or neutral targets could be implemented. We
sought to correct this issue with Study 2 and Study 3. We also hoped to enroll a greater number
of Republican or conservative participants. Study 1 took place in-person and in a lab free of
distractions. Participants were directed to use the computer in front of them to access an actual
fake news article and related correction posted online. Because of the shortened Spring 2020
semester, a similar procedure was not possible. Therefore, in Study 2 and Study 3, we changed
the procedure to embed a fake news article and correction designed for the purpose of the study
so that it could be similar across all conditions, and to not rely on articles posted online. While
this decreased external validity, it increased internal validity.
In Study 2 and Study 3, the images used for the target individuals in both the fake news
articles and corrections may not have been similar enough, which could have possibly impacted
results (see Appendix A, B, and C). We felt that it was important to use real images of the targets
in order to have participants believe that they were reading articles transcribed from elsewhere.

The images were selected because they were somewhat unflattering or appeared to show the
targets in a negative or critical light (e.g. surrounded by reporters, expressing anger or
embarrassment), and portraying subjects unfavorably in this manner is common in fake news.
However, there are differences between the images that could be confounding factors. For
example, the image of Adam Schiff shows another well-known politician in the background,
while the others do not.
Study 2 revealed a negative correlation between conservatism scores on the PBS and
rating change for competence and warmth. More conservative participants updated their beliefs
less than others, and particularly so for Democrat and neutral targets. Participants who scored
higher in liberalism or intellectual humility updated their beliefs more upon correction. In Study
3, significant differences were found between participant political party: Republican participants
rated Democrat and neutral targets much lower than Republican targets. While this is not too
surprising, Figure 7 shows that Democrat and no party participants responded similarly to all
targets, while Republicans responded quite differently. In addition, the exploratory use of the
Intellectual Humility Scale indicated that it may prove to be a useful measure in future research
on partisan schemas.
Results may suggest that Republican or conservative participants are less willing to
update their beliefs, and greater intellectual humility is more common among Democrats or
liberals which may aid in receiving corrective information. However, care must be taken not to
overextend these results as if they are monolithic. Indeed, some research suggests that selfidentified conservatives may be more diverse in their political beliefs than are liberals (Feldman
& Johnston, 2014; Klein & Stern, 2005; Stenner, 2009), and people on the left and right are

equally likely to employ schemas in judgments, relying more on situational cues to engage in
acceptable behavior (Crawford, 2012).
The value of diversity of gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and more is wellestablished, particularly in academia where differing viewpoints and perspectives are vital to
critical analysis. However, the low turn-out of Republican and conservative participants across
all studies may represent a different sort of diversity problem in higher education and in the field
of psychology. Ferguson et al. (2018) found evidence that introductory textbooks in psychology
contained error and liberal-leaning biases that reflected socio-political homogeneity of the field,
and argued that the problem may be exacerbated by APA position statements written by
ideologically invested scholars. When conservative undergraduates enter psychology classes,
they may feel unwelcome or unwilling to contribute (Duarte et al., 2015). In the psychology
major, 84% of college professors identify as liberal, and only 8% identify as conservative
(Rothman et al., 2005), while in the United States as a whole, the ratio of liberals to
conservatives is roughly 1 to 2 (Saad, 2010). Even if one does not agree with conservative views,
the absence of conservative viewpoints in academia, and indeed some hostility towards them,
makes it difficult to examine political beliefs in general or to even discuss them for a better
understanding.
Overall, there was certainly a diversity problem both in the university subject pool and on
Prolific that hinders the ability of the study to be extended to the general population: participants
overwhelmingly identified as Caucasian/white, liberal and female. The lack of diversity in other
ways, including Republican or conservative-leaning participants, was an overall limitation of the
study. For this type of research, the issue could be corrected in the future by specifically recruiting
Republican participants. Of course, recruiting a larger sample might bring more demographic

diversity, which can bring viewpoint diversity, but because it was viewpoint diversity that was
wanted, it may be more effective to pursue it directly.
Implications
Many Americans currently believe fake news and misinformation to be a serious issue,
more so than other issues such as climate change or racial tension (Mitchell et al., 2019). This
fear seems to be healthy, as fake news has caused a multitude of issues by exploiting how we
process information, and the systems we use to do so. Falsehoods spread more readily than truth
online (Vosoughi et al., 2018), people share misinformation unknowingly while acknowledging
that it confuses dialogue and agreement on basic facts (Barthel et al., 2016), and simply
repeatedly encountering fake news headlines makes it seem less unethical to share (Effron &
Raj, 2020). More importantly, encountering the same information repeatedly increases the
likelihood that an individual will later consider it true, even if they were originally made aware
that it is false (DiFonzo et al., 2016).
For example, 10% of Americans still believe that the risks of vaccines outweigh the
benefits (Hefferon & Funk, 2020), despite over a decade of efforts to debunk misinformation that
indicated a link between vaccines and autism (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
2020). The prevalence of this belief, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, hints at a
severe problem. Vaccine skepticism may be enough to cause outbreaks of diseases that would
otherwise be close to eradication (Hussain et al., 2018), an issue of particular relevance given the
current pandemic. An unprecedented amount of harm to the credibility of all vaccines was
accomplished primarily by a single misleading study, one that most adherents to anti-vaccination
beliefs likely have not read or fully understood (Hussain et al., 2018).

A growing body of evidence suggests that misinformation has become more frequent and
more effective among specific audiences largely due to the rise of social media (Del Vicario et
al., 2016; Guess et al., 2018; Mitchell et al., 2019; Murphy et al., 2019). For example, Luisi
(2021) found that four out of every ten posts on Facebook about the vaccine for human
papillomavirus (HPV) were negative, and focused on the supposed risks and threats of the
vaccine, despite there being little evidence to support these claims. The author suggests that
misinformation that is negative or amplifies perceived risks spreads more easily online, which
may help explain the prevalence of it. Many people now receive a majority of their news and
information through social media platforms and social networks (Hermida et al., 2012; Shearer,
2018). Despite low expectations regarding accuracy, most Americans obtain at least some of
their news from social media sources (Shearer & Mitchell, 2021). In addition, while Bergström
and Belfrage (2018) found that many people consider themselves well-informed consumers of
news, their behavior indicates a more casual, “incidental” approach to news and information
consumption. Pennycook et al. (2020) found that many social media users did not consider the
accuracy of information before sharing it, but would do so if prompted; when asked to rate
information accuracy before sharing it, participants were more likely to correctly discern whether
the information was true or false.
When information is shared via social media, those affiliated with groups often receive
clusters of messages and belief-supporting material, both verifiable information (e.g. scientific)
and unverifiable (e.g. conspiracy) (Del Vicario et al., 2016). In this way, groups of individuals
may be more likely to continue believing in schema-supporting misinformation, which can result
in homogeneity of information or “echo chambers” that decrease the likelihood of encountering
opposing views or evidence, and amplify the perceived trustworthiness of misinformation

(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Del Vicario et al., 2016). These factors have made misinformation
very difficult to correct; prior beliefs and schemas may make fact-checking unlikely while
reducing the effectiveness of corrections.
We argue here that the strength of misinformation and weakness of corrections or factchecking may be traced to the influence of schemas, as suggested by Johnson and Seifert’s
(1994) original work on the continued influence effect and research on the bipolar schemas
related to political orientation. Guess et al. (2018) found that, among the over 2500 Americans
who granted the researchers access to their individual web history, 1 in 4 visited fake news
websites during the 2016 election cycle. Those who supported Donald Trump for U.S. president
were particularly likely to visit fake news websites; 58.9% of all visits to fake news websites
were by 10% of those with the most conservative news diets. Similar to anti-vaccination beliefs,
negative beliefs about other subjects that have widespread acceptance within the scientific
community such as anthropogenic climate change, are frequently associated with conservative
political schemas (Pew Research Center, 2015). In even more recent events, conservatism
predicted reduced concerns about the threat posed by COVID-19, belief in media exaggeration of
the threat, and inability to discern real and fake news related to COVID-19 (Calvillo et al., 2020).
The authors also found that knowledge about and approval of U.S. president Donald Trump
mediated these effects, suggesting that authority figures that an individual trusts could be helpful
in communicating corrective information and reducing the impact of misinformation.
Fake news is often negative or critical and designed to cause strong emotions, which have
been linked to reliance on schemas in judgments. For example, anger may make individuals rely
on the perceived credibility of the source rather than the quality of the message (Bodenhausen et
al., 1994). In a recent experiment by Greenstein and Franklin (2020), participants were more

vulnerable to schema-consistent misinformation when they were angry, but anger was not related
to memory errors for true information. Angry participants also made decisions more quickly and
with increased confidence. Innocuous or mood-neutral misinformation may be less effective
overall, but it is also possible that anger-inducing misinformation would be more effective in
prompting reliance on partisan schemas, and we suggest examining this as a potential direction
for future research.
Conclusion
In another study completed at Bridgewater State University (Spievak et al., 2020),
researchers asked participants to rate the quality and partisan bias of real news sources.
Participants indicated that news sources congruent with their political beliefs were less biased
and higher quality, and incongruent sources were more biased and lower quality. Another trend
emerged, as well: overall, participants considered very few sources to be “news,” instead rating
them at best, “fair interpretations of the news.” Those who identified as Democrats were more
likely to rate sources as high quality news, (e.g. NPR and The New York Times, both considered
by media bias experts to be reliable news sources; see: www.mediabiasfactcheck.com), and they
rated Fox News as extremely low quality. By contrast, Republicans indicated that almost all
news sources were low quality and “unfair interpretations of the news,” including Fox News,
which is typically considered to be largely in agreement with Republican and conservative
schemas. This trend poses a problem: if those with right-leaning partisan schemas do not
consider any sources to be news, or even fair interpretations of it, even when it is in agreement
with their opinions, then perhaps they do not consider any source to be trustworthy. If that is the
case, then they may regard the truth as a matter of opinion instead. Those who seek out

information that is schema-consistent and have little interest in the quality of reporting, analysis,
or evidence, would be similarly uninterested in correction.
CIM may be more serious than a quirk of human cognition. As attitudes, values and
beliefs with regard to politics become ever more polarized in the U.S. (Wilson et al., 2020),
made worse by social media (Bail et al., 2018), and these beliefs may have a substantial impact
on how misinformation is received and corrected, there is potential for a further breakdown of
reasonable discourse.
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Table 1
Reliability of Measures for All Studies
Measures
Study 1
Study 2
Study 3
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)
.88
.88
.94
Political Belief Scale (PBS)
Liberal
.67
.62
.71
Moderate
.60
.26
.19
Conservative
.68
.65
.86
15 aggregate ratings in Study 1
.94
Stereotype Content Model (SCM)
Competence
.82
.89
Warmth
.86
.93
Intellectual Humility (IH)
.85
.73
Open-Mindedness
.72
.82
Modesty
.69
.79
Corrigibility
.78
.77
Engagement
.67
.78
Note. Values that are not in the table (e.g. Study 1 Competence) are due to not being used in that
particular study, or a combined reliability would be inappropriate (e.g. PBS).

Table 2
Study 1 Correlations of Political Beliefs and Evaluations of Target
Measures
Pre-correction
Post-correction
Liberalism
.299**
.481**
Moderate
-.085
.181*
Conservatism
-.120
-.360**
Social Dominance Orientation
-.114
-.020
Self-identified political leaning
-.168*
-.423
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Rating change
.151
.341**
-.222
.053
-.218

Table 3
Study 2 Correlations Between Intellectual Humility Subscales and Rating Change
Measures
Competence
Warmth
All targets
IH Total
.167*
.159*
IH Open-Mindedness
.157*
.169*
IH Modesty
.130
.137
IH Corrigibility
.045
.063
IH Engagement
.172*
.116
Democrat target
IH Total
.217
.171
IH Open-Mindedness
.088
.087
IH Modesty
.168
.098
IH Corrigibility
.175
.127
IH Engagement
.229
.202
Republican target
IH Total
.146
.211
IH Open-Mindedness
.061
.119
IH Modesty
.328*
.362**
IH Corrigibility
-.026
.083
IH Engagement
-.006
-.014
Neutral target
IH Total
.158
.125
IH Open-Mindedness
.319*
.274*
IH Modesty
-.078
.045
IH Corrigibility
.017
.038
IH Engagement
.278*
.166
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Table 4
Study 3 Means for Competence and Warmth Rating by Participant Political Party and Target
Political Party
Targets
Pre competence
Pre warmth
Post competence
Post warmth
All participants
All targets
-.462
-1.303
.236
-.265
Democrat participant
Democrat
-.430
-1.110
.417
-.020
Republican
-.970
-1.571
-.405
-.834
Neutral
-.563
-1.601
.503
-.107
Republican participant
Democrat
.050
-.694
.091
-.571
Republican
.167
-.200
.463
.333
Neutral
.083
-1.214
.738
.184
No party participant
Democrat
.017
-1.043
.681
.226
Republican
-.600
-1.622
-.202
-.594
Neutral
-.320
-1.186
.395
.338

Table 5
Study 3 Correlations Between Intellectual Humility Subscales and Rating Change
Competence
Warmth
All targets
IH Total
.113
.157
IH Open-Mindedness
.188*
.203*
IH Modesty
.100
.201*
IH Corrigibility
.061
.090
IH Engagement
.010
.004
Democrat target
IH Total
.331*
.156
IH Open-Mindedness
.165
-.019
IH Modesty
.386**
.239
IH Corrigibility
.265*
.187
IH Engagement
.187
.064
Republican target
IH Total
-.173
-.254*
IH Open-Mindedness
-.155
-.286*
IH Modesty
-.043
-.055
IH Corrigibility
-.083
-.139
IH Engagement
-.242
-.295*
Neutral target
IH Total
-.079
-.056
IH Open-Mindedness
-.096
-.068
IH Modesty
-.059
-.141
IH Corrigibility
-.028
.000
IH Engagement
-.064
.043
*p < .05. **p < .01.

Figure 1
Study 2 Competence and Warmth Ratings for Democrat, Republican or Neutral Targets by
Democrat Participants
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Figure 2
Study 2 Competence and Warmth Ratings for Democrat, Republican or Neutral Targets by
Republican Participants
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Figure 3
Study 2 Competence and Warmth Ratings for Democrat, Republican or Neutral Targets by No
Party Participants
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Figure 4
Study 3 Competence and Warmth Ratings for Democrat, Republican or Neutral Targets by
Democrat Participants
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Figure 5
Study 3 Competence and Warmth Ratings for Democrat, Republican or Neutral Targets by
Republican Participants
2

1.5

1

Warmth

0.5

0

-0.5

-1

-1.5

-2
-2

-1.5

-1

-0.5

0

0.5

1

Competence
Overall pre-post

Democrat target pre-post

Republican target pre-post

Neutral target pre-post

1.5

2

Figure 6
Study 3 Competence and Warmth Ratings for Democrat, Republican or Neutral Targets by No
Party Participants
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Figure 7
Study 3 Competence and Warmth Post Correction by Target Political Party
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Appendix A
How intelligent do you think this individual is?
How efficient do you think this individual is?
How skillful do you think this individual is?
How friendly do you think this individual is?
How responsible do you think this individual is?
How competent do you think this individual is?
How likable do you think this individual is?
How trustworthy do you think this individual is?
How professional do you think this individual is?
How sincere do you think this individual is?
How warm do you think this individual is?
How positive do you think this individual is?
How favorable do you think this individual is?
How good-natured do you think this individual is?
How well-intentioned do you think this individual is?

Appendix B

Democrat House
Representative Suspected
of Embezzling $1.6 Million
From Federal Government
Fri, 21 Aug 2020

Officials intend to pursue charges ' very soon'
U.S. Treasury officials announced today that they plan to pursue charges against
Democrat House Representative Adam Schiff, 60, of California, for embezzling almost
$1.6 million from taxpayers over a ten-year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2020
through a wire fraud scheme. Schiff may also be charged with money laundering,
aggravated identity theft, and filing false income tax returns during this period.
Schiff, a House Representative in California for the Democratic Party since 2001,
allegedly opened a PayPal account using a fake name, transferred federal funds to that
PayPal account, from that PayPal account to another PayPal account belonging to his

wife, and from his wife’s PayPal account to one or more of his personal bank accounts.
Further, Schiff allegedly concealed the embezzlement by falsifying financial entries on
files he maintained for the federal government.
Treasury officials assert that Schiff failed to pay taxes on his wealth, embezzled at least
$854,800 and had unreported income of $231,100 in 2015, $215,100 in 2016, $83,600
in 2017, $125,000 in 2018, $152,000 in 2019, and $48,000 in 2020. If proven true, his
actions created a tax loss of approximately $240,648.
Officials say they plan to charge Schiff with 48 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of money
laundering, six counts of filing a false income tax return, and one count of aggravated
identity theft. Wire fraud and money laundering are punishable by up to 20 years in
prison. Filing a false tax return is punishable by up to three years. Aggravated identity
theft is punishable by a mandatory two years of prison that must follow any term
imposed on the other counts. Additionally, Schiff may be subject to restitution and/or
forfeiture of money and substitute assets totaling $1,589,315.
“We take offenses like embezzlement, tax fraud and money laundering very seriously,”
an announcement published online by the U.S. Treasury read. “Schiff stole more than a
million dollars by abusing his position handling finances for the federal government. We
will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect innocent taxpayers
from being victimized by this type of fraud.”
“The role of IRS Criminal Investigation becomes even more important in embezzlement
and fraud cases due to the complex financial transactions that can take time to unravel,”
said a spokesperson for the IRS CI. “As we often see, federal tax laws are normally
violated in these types of cases and IRS CI is committed to ensuring that everyone pays
their fair share.”

Republican House
Representative Suspected
of Embezzling $1.6 Million
From Federal Government

Fri, 21 Aug 2020

Officials intend to pursue charges ' very soon'
U.S. Treasury officials announced today that they plan to pursue charges against
Republican House Representative Jim Jordan, 56, of Ohio, for embezzling almost $1.6
million from taxpayers over a ten-year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2020
through a wire fraud scheme. Jordan may also be charged with money laundering,
aggravated identity theft, and filing false income tax returns during this period.
Jordan, a House Representative in Ohio for the Republican Party since 2007, allegedly
opened a PayPal account using a fake name, transferred federal funds to that PayPal
account, from that PayPal account to another PayPal account belonging to his wife, and
from his wife’s PayPal account to one or more of his personal bank accounts. Further,
Jordan allegedly concealed the embezzlement by falsifying financial entries on files he
maintained for the federal government.
Treasury officials assert that Jordan failed to pay taxes on his wealth, embezzled at
least $854,800 and had unreported income of $231,100 in 2015, $215,100 in 2016,
$83,600 in 2017, $125,000 in 2018, $152,000 in 2019, and $48,000 in 2020. If proven
true, his actions created a tax loss of approximately $240,648.
Officials say they plan to charge Jordan with 48 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of
money laundering, six counts of filing a false income tax return, and one count of
aggravated identity theft. Wire fraud and money laundering are punishable by up to 20
years in prison. Filing a false tax return is punishable by up to three years. Aggravated
identity theft is punishable by a mandatory two years of prison that must follow any term
imposed on the other counts. Additionally, Jordan may be subject to restitution and/or

forfeiture of money and substitute assets totaling $1,589,315.
“We take offenses like embezzlement, tax fraud and money laundering very seriously,”
an announcement published online by the U.S. Treasury read. “Jordan stole more than
a million dollars by abusing his position handling finances for the federal government.
We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect innocent
taxpayers from being victimized by this type of fraud.”
“The role of IRS Criminal Investigation becomes even more important in embezzlement
and fraud cases due to the complex financial transactions that can take time to unravel,”
said a spokesperson for the IRS CI. “As we often see, federal tax laws are normally
violated in these types of cases and IRS CI is committed to ensuring that everyone pays
their fair share.”

Starbucks CEO Suspected
of Embezzling $1.6 Million
From Company
Fri, 21 Aug 2020

Officials intend to pursue charges ' very soon'

FBI officials announced today that they plan to pursue charges against Starbucks CEO
Kevin Johnson, 59, of Washington, for embezzling almost $1.6 million from the
company over a ten-year period beginning in 2010 and ending in 2020 through a wire
fraud scheme. Johnson may also be charged with money laundering, aggravated
identity theft, and filing false income tax returns during this period.
Johnson, president and CEO of Starbucks Coffee Company since 2017 and chief
operating office since 2015, allegedly opened a PayPal account using a fake name,
transferred company funds to that PayPal account, from that PayPal account to another
PayPal account belonging to his wife, and from his wife’s PayPal account to one or
more of his personal bank accounts. Further, Johnson allegedly concealed the
embezzlement by falsifying financial entries on files he maintained for the company.
FBI and IRS officials assert that Johnson failed to pay taxes on his wealth, embezzled
at least $854,800 and had unreported income of $231,100 in 2015, $215,100 in 2016,
$83,600 in 2017, $125,000 in 2018, $152,000 in 2019, and $48,000 in 2020. If proven
true, his actions created a tax loss of approximately $240,648.
Officials say they plan to charge Johnson with 48 counts of wire fraud, 10 counts of
money laundering, six counts of filing a false income tax return, and one count of
aggravated identity theft. Wire fraud and money laundering are punishable by up to 20
years in prison. Filing a false tax return is punishable by up to three years. Aggravated
identity theft is punishable by a mandatory two years of prison that must follow any term
imposed on the other counts. Additionally, Johnson may be subject to restitution and/or
forfeiture of money and substitute assets totaling $1,589,315.
“We take offenses like embezzlement, tax fraud and money laundering very seriously,”
an announcement published online by the FBI read. “Johnson stole more than a million
dollars by abusing his position handling finances for the company he works for. We will
continue to work with our law enforcement partners to protect innocent investors from
being victimized by this type of fraud.”
“The role of IRS Criminal Investigation becomes even more important in embezzlement
and fraud cases due to the complex financial transactions that can take time to unravel,”
said a spokesperson for the IRS CI. “As we often see, federal tax laws are normally
violated in these types of cases and IRS CI is committed to ensuring that everyone pays
their fair share.”

Appendix C

Did Democrat House Rep
Adam Schiff embezzle
money from the federal
government?
Wed, 26 Aug 2020

Recently, an article appeared on social media and has subsequently been shared many
times, claiming that Democrat House Representative Adam Schiff engaged in
embezzlement, wire fraud, and other crimes. This article, shared from
worldnewsdailyreport.com, details the allegations against Schiff. The article included
quotes from U.S. Treasury and IRS officials, which made it appear genuine at first
glance.
However, the article was researched by fact-checkers and determined to be a complete
fabrication. The details of that article were primarily copied from an article hosted on
Justice.gov about a bookkeeper from Philadelphia who embezzled funds from the
company he worked for. The original article is genuine and a factual reporting of events.

However, while some details, such as dollar amounts, remained untouched, most other
details were changed. All references to the original defendant were changed to Adam
Schiff, and other details were also changed to relate to political institutions and more
specifically to Schiff. In other words, the article appears to be intentional misinformation
targeting a politician.
For example, in the original and factual article, it was a U.S attorney who made the
announcement, and provided a later quote. In the altered version, the announcement
and quote are attributed to the U.S. Treasury generally. Additionally, when the original
article was released, the defendant had already been convicted, while the altered
version states that Schiff will be charged. Many other details were either changed or
removed entirely.
The website that posted the article, worldnewsdailyreport.com, is a well-known purveyor
of misinformation and hoaxes despite billing itself as “satire.” At the bottom of the
website is the following disclaimer: "World News Daily Report assumes all responsibility
for the satirical nature of its articles and for the fictional nature of their content. All
characters appearing in the articles in this website – even those based on real people –
are entirely fictional and any resemblance between them and any person, living, dead or
undead, is purely a miracle.” While some articles simply make outrageous claims, such
as “Death Row Inmate Eats An Entire Bible As Last Meal”, others are more political in
nature, as demonstrated by the Adam Schiff story.
No such allegations have been made against Adam Schiff.

Did Republican House Rep
Jim Jordan embezzle
money from the federal
government?
Wed, 26 Aug 2020

Recently, an article appeared on social media and has subsequently been shared many
times, claiming that Republican House Representative Jim Jordan engaged in
embezzlement, wire fraud, and other crimes. This article, shared from
worldnewsdailyreport.com, details the allegations against Jordan. The article included
quotes from U.S. Treasury and IRS officials, which made it appear genuine at first
glance.
However, the article was researched by fact-checkers and determined to be a complete
fabrication. The details of that article were primarily copied from an article hosted on
Justice.gov about a bookkeeper from Philadelphia who embezzled funds from the
company he worked for. The original article is genuine and a factual reporting of events.
However, while some details, such as dollar amounts, remained untouched, most other
details were changed. All references to the original defendant were changed to Jim
Jordan, and other details were also changed to relate to political institutions and more
specifically to Jordan. In other words, the article appears to be intentional
misinformation targeting a politician.
For example, in the original and factual article, it was a U.S attorney who made the
announcement, and provided a later quote. In the altered version, the announcement
and quote are attributed to the U.S. Treasury generally. Additionally, when the original
article was released, the defendant had already been convicted, while the altered
version states that Jordan will be charged. Many other details were either changed or
removed entirely.
The website that posted the article, worldnewsdailyreport.com, is a well-known purveyor
of misinformation and hoaxes despite billing itself as “satire.” At the bottom of the
website is the following disclaimer: "World News Daily Report assumes all responsibility

for the satirical nature of its articles and for the fictional nature of their content. All
characters appearing in the articles in this website – even those based on real people –
are entirely fictional and any resemblance between them and any person, living, dead or
undead, is purely a miracle.” While some articles simply make outrageous claims, such
as “Death Row Inmate Eats An Entire Bible As Last Meal”, others are more political in
nature, as demonstrated by the Jim Jordan story.
No such allegations have been made against Jim Jordan.

Did Starbucks CEO Kevin
Johnson embezzle money
from the company?
Wed, 26 Aug 2020

Recently, an article appeared on social media and has subsequently been shared many
times, claiming that Starbucks CEO and president Kevin Johnson engaged in
embezzlement, wire fraud, and other crimes. This article, shared from
worldnewsdailyreport.com, details the allegations against Johnson. The article included
quotes from FBI and IRS officials, which made it appear genuine at first glance.
However, the article was researched by fact-checkers and determined to be a complete

fabrication. The details of that article were primarily copied from an article hosted on
Justice.gov about a bookkeeper from Philadelphia who embezzled funds from the
company he worked for. The original article is genuine and a factual reporting of events.
However, while some details, such as dollar amounts, remained untouched, most other
details were changed. All references to the original defendant were changed to Kevin
Johnson, and other details were also changed to relate to Starbucks and more
specifically to Johnson. In other words, the article appears to be intentional
misinformation targeting a corporate executive.
For example, in the original and factual article, it was a U.S attorney who made the
announcement, and provided a later quote. In the altered version, the announcement
and quote are attributed to the FBI generally. Additionally, when the original article was
released, the defendant had already been convicted, while the altered version states
that Johnson will be charged. Many other details were either changed or removed
entirely.
The website that posted the article, worldnewsdailyreport.com, is a well-known purveyor
of misinformation and hoaxes despite billing itself as “satire.” At the bottom of the
website is the following disclaimer: "World News Daily Report assumes all responsibility
for the satirical nature of its articles and for the fictional nature of their content. All
characters appearing in the articles in this website – even those based on real people –
are entirely fictional and any resemblance between them and any person, living, dead or
undead, is purely a miracle.” While some articles simply make outrageous claims, such
as “Death Row Inmate Eats An Entire Bible As Last Meal”, others are more political in
nature.
No such allegations have been made against Kevin Johnson.

